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The original position and the rationality of Primo Levi’s shame1 
Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after 
being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like 
many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish. It took 
some effort for him to discern the object or source of this anguish. He 
finally identified it as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of 
the drowned, that is, of those who were exterminated in the Lager. He could 
not determine, however, whether his shame or guilt was at all rational: 
Is this belated shame justified or not? I was not able to decide then and I am not 
able to decide even now, but shame was there and is there, concrete, heavy, 
perennial.2  
It seems then that Levi could neither acknowledge his shame as rational 
nor reject it as irrational. This looks like a rather unstable situation calling 
for some further elucidation, so that we might eventually reach a more 
consistent understanding of where Levi’s shame stands with regard to 
rationality and, for this purpose, I will examine Levi’s shame in light of 
what I regard as the dominant conception of practical deliberation, 
according to which principles and emotional detachment are central to our 
ability to deliberate appropriately. This conception underlies the role that 
John Rawls ascribes to the original position in the determination of the 
fundamental principles of justice. Deliberation in the original position is 
1 This paper draws on materials to be published as part of chapter 1 in Morality, Self-
Knowledge, and Human Suffering: An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World 
(Routledge, New York and London, 2012). Credit is due to Routledge for authorizing 
publication of this paper in this volume. I must, finally, acknowledge that research for this 
paper has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSD2009-
00056, FFI2013-47948-P).  
2 Levi (1986), p. 61. 
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supposed to abstract away from any particular moral situations that one may 
actually have faced, since these are purely circumstantial elements to be 
discarded as both irrelevant and misleading for a proper deliberation on the 
principles of justice. In this paper, I intend both to make a case against the 
conception of practical deliberation on which Rawls’ original position relies 
and to vindicate the rationality of Levi’s shame, once some well-entrenched 
assumptions are brought to light and challenged. 
More specifically, I will firstly stress how Rawls’ use of the original 
position as a representational device to the determine the principles of 
justice relies a certain assumption (i.e., the Matching Assumption) that 
Levi’s experience calls into question (sections 1-3) and, secondly, I will 
identify two assumptions (i.e, The Control Assumption and The Third-Party 
Assumption) that are constitutive of Rawls’ conception of rationality and 
such that they may account for Levi’s reluctance to acknowledge the 
rationality of his shame. Once these constraints are brought out, I will argue 
that Levi’s experience -together with that of other survivors- provides 
serious reason to call them into question inasmuch as it invites the existence 
of a fundamental asymmetry between the first- and the third-person 
perspectives (sec. 3-5). I will thus conclude that Primo Levi could 
coherently have regarded his blame as rational, even though no third party is 
a position to blame him. This challenge to the primacy of the third-person 
perspective will provide, in turn, an additional argument against Rawls’ 
original position and the dominant conception of practical deliberation. 
1. John Rawls: The Original Position
The original position is initially presented as a device of representation,
as a thought experiment, designed to determine the fundamental principles 
of justice for the basic structure of society3. All this on the assumption that 
we are dealing with a stable society «divided by reasonably though 
incompatible religious, political, and moral doctrines»4. For it is this kind of 
society that gives rise to the problem of political liberalism, namely, how it 
is possible that in such circumstances «there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens» 5. From this perspective, the 
plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is not regarded so much as 
3 Rawls (1999), pp. 10-12, 506; Rawls (2001), p. xvii; Rawls (2005), p. xviii. 
4 Rawls (2005), p. xviii. 
5 Ibidem. 
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a regrettable accident, but as «the normal result of the exercise of human 
reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional 
democratic regime»6.  
The principles that the original position may eventually deliver, as well 
as the particular judgments that may follow from them, must meet the 
demands of reflective equilibrium, that is, they must match «our considered 
judgments once they have been pruned and adjusted»7. There is, however, a 
distinction Rawls does not explicitly mention, but seems essential to his 
project, namely, the distinction between: 
A Hypothetical C-Judgment: An agent’s considered judgment about a 
particular moral situation S, such that she has not actually faced either S 
itself or any other particular situation S* relevantly similar to S, 
and 
An Actual C-Judgment: An agent’s considered judgment about a particular 
moral situation S once she has actually faced S or some other particular 
situation S* relevantly similar to S; 
where ‘‘c-judgment” stand for “considered judgment”. The first kind of 
judgment may be regarded as hypothetical insofar as the agent is not 
evaluating a situation S she has actually experienced, but a situation that she 
(or someone else) might eventually face; by contrast, the second kind of 
judgment appears as actual insofar as the agent is (or has been) faced with 
the situation (or a relevantly similar one) that she is trying to assess. In view 
of this distinction, the sorts of judgments that the original position might 
deliver will certainly qualify as hypothetical. In any case, it seems clear that, 
if the original position is to pass the reflective equilibrium test, the 
following assumption must be made: 
if agents deliberate flawlessly, there will be no mismatch between their 
hypothetical c-judgments and their actual c-judgments.   
For, otherwise, there would be no reason to think that our judgments in 
the original position will be able to reasonably track both our hypothetical c-
6 Ivi, p. xvii. 
7 Rawls (1999), p. 18, my emphasis. See Goodman (1983), pp. 63-64. 
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judgments and our actual c-judgments, as reflective equilibrium seems to 
demand. I will argue, however, that there are some cases of mismatch that a 
certain kind of flaw cannot explain away, namely: a flaw that agents could 
reasonably be expected to overcome from within their own respective 
stances, either hypothetical or actual. Moreover, I defend the view that in 
some such cases it is the actual c-judgment that must prevail. Trivially, this 
line of reasoning does not call into question the previous assumption as it 
stands, since one or another sort of deliberative mistake could still be 
involved in the cases of mismatch I intend to highlight. There is, however, a 
stronger assumption that the original position must grant, namely: 
The Matching Assumption: if agents deliberate in such a way that they make 
no mistake that could reasonably have been prevented from within their 
respective deliberative stances, either hypothetical or actual, there is no 
room for a mismatch between their hypothetical c-judgments and their 
actual c-judgments. 
Still, I will argue that, insofar as the original position is to be construed 
as a device of representation, the modality of ‘could’ must be constrained in 
such a way that the Matching Assumption turns out to be false. To develop 
my case, I will mainly rely on Primo Levi’s description of his experience of 
shame as a survivor of Auschwitz in his last book, namely: The Drowned 
and the Saved8. More specifically, I will focus on his experience of shame 
to conclude that his actual c-judgments on that experience must prevail over 
what would have been his hypothetical c-judgment about it, and also that 
this mismatch could not reasonably have been surmounted by further 
hypothetical deliberation. This will put the Matching Assumption under 
some pressure, as we shall see; and consequently invite the thought that the 
deliverances of the original position may not always prevail over an agent’s 
actual c-judgments. Of course, one could doubt the relevance of Levi’s c-
judgments themselves insofar as Levi’s views on shame may not be 
regarded as particularly authoritative. Let me just mention as a reply that 
The Drowned and the Saved is usually presented as a central contribution to 
our understanding of the survivor’s experience. It seems then that his 
considered judgment on this matter has thoroughly been recognized as 
particularly significant and, consequently, that any relevant worry about any 
8 Levi (1986). 
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given judgment of his ought to be grounded on some specific reasons and 
not on the overall idea that he could be wrong; for, otherwise, the demand 
that the original position must pass the reflective equilibrium test would 
become empty. 
2. Primo Levi’s Shame: Stereotypical Expectations.
In Levi (1986, ch. 3), he puts forward his maturest view on his
experience of shame. He highlights, to begin with, the mismatch between 
his view about liberation while he was still imprisoned in Auschwitz (say, 
time T0) and after his liberation (say, time T1). At time T0, Levi was 
convinced that, if he survived, he would have nothing to feel ashamed of or 
guilty for. And it was on this assumption that he expected his life after 
liberation to be light-hearted and joyful. It happened though that, at time T1 
and despite this expectations to the contrary, he was haunted by deep 
anguish which he finally recognized as springing from a sense of shame for 
what he actually did or fell short of doing in the extermination camp: 
That many (and myself) experienced ‘shame’, that is, a feeling of guilt during 
the imprisonment and afterwards is an ascertained fact confirmed by numerous 
testimonies. It may seem absurd, but it does exist. I will try to interpret it myself, 
and to comment on the interpretations of others.9  
The mismatch between Levi’s expectations and his actual experience 
may seem, at first sight, quite irrelevant from a normative point of view 
insofar as it may sound like just another case in which reality does not meet 
one’s expectations. Yet, even though the discomfort which gave rise to the 
mismatch was at the outset merely experienced as anguish, it was later on 
discovered to involve a moral self-reproach and, thereby, some room seems 
to have been made for normative considerations. In any case, some people 
might still reply that the mismatch in question is not at all relevant to the 
debate about the original position insofar as it can hardly be identified as a 
mismatch between two considered moral judgments. For, given the survival 
conditions in the extermination camp, Levi’s judgment at T0 could hardly be 
presented as such. In fact, Levi himself stresses that his expectations derived 
from a stereotypical view about liberation that he (like many others) had 
9 Levi (1986), p. 54. 
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stereotyped judgments do not at all qualify as considered: 
There exists a stereotyped picture, proposed innumerable times, consecrated by 
literature and poetry and picked up by the cinema; at the end of the storm, when 
“the quiet after the storm” arrives, all hearts rejoice. “To be freed from pain is 
delightful for us”. After the disease, health returns; to deliver us from 
imprisonment “our boys” arrive just in time, the liberators, with waving flags; 
the soldier returns and again finds his family and peace.10  
Levi’s reflection at T1 surely constitutes an attempt to go beyond the 
stereotype in order to uncover his genuine experience – otherwise, 
“convention prevails over genuine memory”11. The upshot of this reflection 
may thus be taken as a considered judgment about the moral significance of 
his shame, but it is still clear that Levi’s judgment at T0 can hardly count as 
such. What could then be the relevance of Levi’s experience for the 
Matching Assumption and, in the end, for the original position if no conflict 
between considered judgments has so far been detected? Further aspects of 
Levi’s experience need then to be examined in order to make my case 
against the original position.  
3. Is Levi’s Shame Rational?
Like many other survivors, Levi felt deep shame (or guilt) after his
liberation. But what was he ashamed of? It was not at all a trivial endeavour 
for him to determine what the actual sources of his shame might have been. 
And, yet, a number of them were finally discerned. Firstly, there is the fact 
that he had systematically accepted being diminished and humiliated, 
without the slightest reaction on his side12. Secondly, he accuses himself of 
failure in terms of human solidarity, that is, of omitting to offer help to those 
who were weak and helpless. This was actually perceived among prisoners 
in Auschwitz as a more serious failure than deliberately hurting or robbing 
someone13. There is, thirdly, the grey zone, that is, the fact that the Nazi 
machinery could not have been so efficient and operative without the 
prisoners’ cooperation, which constitutes what Levi famously named «the 
10 Levi (1986), p. 52. 
11 Ivi, p. 53. 
12 Ivi, pp. 56-57. 
13 Ivi, pp. 58-59. 
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grey zone»14. Even though his participation in the grey zone was not all 
significant, Levi was still haunted by memories of his little acts of 
cooperation and also with his inability to confront in any relevant way the 
Nazi machinery itself15. Fourthly, Levi feels guilty (or ashamed) at the mere 
fact of having survived. For, in his view, the best (that is, those who didn’t 
accept humiliations, were generous with the weak, or rejected to cooperate 
with the Nazi machinery) were quite unlikely to survive. The vast majority 
died. Only the worst, the selfish, have survived and this makes Levi feel like 
a fraud: “I might be alive in the place of another, at the expense of 
another”16. And, finally, there is the shame of the world: one may feel 
shame for the crimes that others and not themselves have committed. For, 
after his experience in Auschwitz, Levi could no longer close his eyes to the 
fact that “no man is an island”17. 
I must unfortunately leave aside a detailed exploration of the Levi’s 
nuanced account of his shame in order to focus on a very specific question: 
“Is my shame (and that of other survivors) rational?” At first sight, it may 
seem that it wasn’t, at least if the notion of control is to play a relevant role. 
For, given the extreme conditions of survival in Auschwitz, one can hardly 
ascribe to Levi the room for manoeuvre, the amount of control over his 
actions and omissions, that is usually required to impute moral 
responsibility. There was, besides, no conspicuous action by which he had 
contributed to the Nazi machinery, or any sense in which he had 
significantly failed to offer help. This is why, at some point, he concludes 
that there is nothing on his side to be ashamed of from the viewpoint of 
rationality: 
Therefore, on a rational plane, there should not have been much to be ashamed 
of, but shame persisted nevertheless, especially before the few, bright examples 
of those who had the strength and possibility to resist.18  
Nevertheless, the question as to whether his shame was really justified 
remains for him unresolved:   
14 Ivi, ch. 2. 
15 Ivi, p. 28. 
16 Ivi, p. 62. 
17 Ivi, p. 65. 
18 Ivi, p. 58. See ivi, p. 54. 
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Is this belated shame justified or not? I was not able to decide then and I am not 
able to decide even now, but shame was there and is there, concrete, heavy, 
perennial.19  
There seems to be a tension between what rationality tells Levi to feel 
and what he actually feels. This may sound, though, like a very familiar 
situation: after all, people’s feelings are quite irrational on many occasions. 
So, why shouldn’t we regard Levi’s shame as just an irrational response? I 
will certainly resist this conclusion. We may, for now, focus on how Levi 
might react to such a conclusion. He could not defend his shame as rational, 
as we have seen; but he was also unable to discard it as purely irrational 
either. This is, indeed, a rather unstable position badly in need of some 
explanation. And, for this purpose, we cannot confine ourselves to Levi’s 
explicit claims on the issue, but must contemplate any other remarks and 
attitudes that may reveal the significance that his shame actually had for him. 
On the basis of this wider body of evidence, we may reasonably conclude 
that, even though Levi may not have felt entitled to judge his shame as 
either rational or irrational, he felt forced to be faithful to it: 
I could not say whether we did so or do so because of a kind of moral obligation 
towards those who were silenced, or rather in order to free ourselves of their 
memory; certainly we do it because of a strong and durable impulse.20  
Some people will certainly be inclined to interpret this impulse, this 
“feeling forced to”, as a merely neurotic disposition, given that Levi himself 
could not recognize it as rational or proportional to the facts. This is, 
however, a temptation Levi explicitly resists, as his own reluctance to 
discard it as simply irrational seems to confirm21.  The rationale behind this 
reluctance was, it seems to me, that obedience to such an impulse was not at 
all perceived by him as base or degrading, but, on the contrary, as part of a 
demand that he could not ignore without feeling debased: 
It was not possible for us, nor did we want, to become islands; the just among us, 
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neither more nor less numerous than in any other human group, felt remorse, 
shame and pain for the misdeeds of others and not they had committed, and in 
which they felt involved, because they sensed that what had happened around 
them in their presence, and in them, was irrevocable.22  
We may, however, take advantage of Levi’s uncertainty as to whether his 
shame was rational in order to argue for the existence of a mismatch 
between his actual c-judgment at time T1 and a hypothetical c-judgment that 
he might have issued at time T-1, that is, a time previous to his deportation 
to Auschwitz. In this respect, he argues that, as a prisoner in Auschwitz, he 
did not have enough room for manoeuvre so that he might reasonably be 
held responsible for what he may actually have done or refrained from doing. 
He is, therefore, convinced that no one could reasonably object to the fact 
that he did not to act otherwise, so that he might have resisted humiliations 
or fought in one or another way the Nazi machinery:  
Changing moral codes is always costly: all heretics, apostates, and dissidents 
know this. We cannot judge our behaviour or that of others, driven at that time 
by the code of that time, on the basis of today’s code; but the anger that 
pervades us when one of the “others” feels entitled to consider us “apostates” or, 
more precisely, reconverted, seems right to me.23  
This line of reasoning rests, however, on two significant assumptions. 
One such assumption is commonly mentioned in philosophical debates and 
also in everyday discussions, namely: 
The Control Assumption: a relevant degree of control or room for 
manoeuvre over one’s actions is a necessary condition for the rationality of 
one’s shame. 
But the second assumption is rarely invoked: 
The Third-Party Assumption: if no one can legitimately accuse me of having 
done something shameful, my shame is irrational. 
22 Ivi, p. 66. 
23 Ivi, p. 61. 
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Levi’s reluctance to acknowledge the rationality of his shame suggests 
that the Control and the Third Party assumptions (as well as the 
corresponding conception of rationality) are deeply entrenched in our 
culture. So deeply ingrained that he was unable to challenge them even 
though they were clearly in conflict with some central aspects of his own 
experience. Consequently, one should expect such assumptions to have 
shaped Levi’s hypothetical c-judgments at T-1, that is, before his deportation 
to Auschwitz. Thus, we say that, had Levi been asked at that time whether 
shame at T1 would have been rational, his hypothetical c-judgment would 
have fallen on the negative side, that is, he would have endorsed the claim 
“In the standard case, the survivor’s shame is irrational”.  Thus, we seem to 
be confronted with a mismatch between a hypothetical and an actual c-
judgment. A hint is, besides, provided as to why our hypothetical c-
judgments may tend to depart from our actual c-judgments on occasions like 
this, namely: because our hypothetical c-judgments are shaped by some 
stereotypical assumptions people can hardly become aware of even after 
conscientious deliberation.  One may regard the interference of such 
assumptions as a failure in deliberation, but barely of the relevant kind to 
our purposes insofar as there is reason to think that Levi (and, in general, 
any cultivated and reflective person) could not have surmounted it at T-1, 
that is, from a merely hypothetical perspective. It must not be inferred from 
the existence of this kind of mismatch that our actual c-judgments should 
always prevail, though; since this may vary from one to another occasion. 
Yet, to make my case against the original position, I only need to show how 
it is the actual c-judgment must be privileged on some relevant occasions. 
And this is what seems to happen in Levi’s case insofar as his actual c-
judgments about his experience as a survivor are regarded as classic, that is, 
a continuous source of understanding as to what happened in the Nazi 
extermination camps and the kind of response it calls for. 
Several objections stand in the way of this line of reasoning. Let me just 
consider two that seem fundamental, even though they point in opposite 
directions. Firstly, some may be inclined to vindicate the capacity of 
hypothetical deliberation to bridge the gap and be as insightful as any actual 
deliberation could be. Thus, they may stress that Levi’s case shows at most 
that people’s hypothetical reflections on certain matters tend to be 
unsatisfactory, but this does not rule out that a more conscientious process 
of hypothetical deliberation might eventually bridge the gap and lead to a 
view as profound and insightful as Levi’s at T1 might have been. In other 
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words, some may say that Levi’s case may bring to light the fact that most 
people only come to understand the full significance of certain facts 
whenever they may actually face them, but this gives us no reason to 
conclude that a sufficiently detailed hypothetical deliberation could not have 
delivered similar results and, therefore, that there is no deliberative 
advantage of our actual c-judgment that could not have been appropriately 
counteracted by further hypothetical deliberation, so that the Matching 
Assumption could finally be retained. This line of objection hinges on a 
fundamental claim:  
(C1) One could always have reached Levi’s actual c-judgment by a more 
conscientious hypothetical deliberation. 
Some constraints must be placed, though, on the modality of “could” if 
claim (C1) must serve to vindicate the original position in front of Levi’s 
actual c-judgment. For such a hypothetical position was presented as a 
device of representation, and actual devices have some operating conditions 
that limit the modality of “could”. But, what could those operating 
conditions be? It sounds reasonable to assume that such conditions must 
somehow refer to our human capabilities and the circumstances in which 
they are normally exercised. Moreover, insofar as political liberalism 
conceives of all agents as free and equal, it seems that the capacities at play 
in the original position must be quite common in adult human agents. We 
may thus restate claim (C1) as follows: 
(C1*) Under normal conditions, human agents could have reached Levi’s 
actual c-judgment conclusion by a more conscientious hypothetical 
deliberation. 
The worry is that Levi, despite being a rather cultivated person, may have 
failed to meet this challenge. For there is serious reason to think that he 
could not have reached at time T-1 the sort of considered judgment that as a 
survivor he felt the need to acknowledge. It has been argued, moreover, that 
his failure didn’t hang on any idiosyncratic features of his, but instead on 
the way stereotypical assumptions may secretly condition anyone’s 
hypothetical deliberation, namely: the Control and the Third Party 
Assumptions. 
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4. Specific Reason and the Fears of Detachment
The second objection presses in the opposite direction. If the first objection 
grants the accuracy of the victims’ judgement and just denies that there were 
serious reason to rule out that a similar judgement could have been attained 
by mere hypothetical means, the second objection calls into question that we 
could reasonably trust the victim’s voice. The fundamental concern is that 
victims are typically so attached to their respective experiences that one 
cannot reasonably expect their voice to be accurate and faithful to the facts. 
Due respect must undoubtedly be paid to Levi’s account of his experience as 
a survivor, but quite a different matter, some may argue, is whether his 
verdicts should really be trusted, since his emotional attachments may easily 
have led him astray. From this perspective, the victim’s judgment about her 
own plight could not be acknowledged as considered, given that a certain 
distance seems indispensable for an impartial and authoritative judgment to 
be obtained. A trivial implication of this line of reasoning is that Levi’s 
view could hardly challenge the Matching Assumption, since his actual 
judgment at T1 does not qualify as considered insofar as it is inevitably 
tainted with his experience in Auschwitz. 
This line of objection relies, however, on a certain stereotype that may 
not ultimately be attested by evidence: it jumps from the trivial fact that our 
emotional attachments tend to cloud our minds to the conclusion that they 
necessarily interfere with our deliberative capacities and to such a degree 
that the victim’s voice must be dispossessed of any authority as to the nature 
of her own plight. And, yet, I will argue that not only emotional attachments, 
but also emotional distance may seriously bias (and, in general, diminish) 
our deliberative capacities. It follows that if we had to dismiss the victim’s 
voice just for the risk of distortion, we should refuse the voice of the 
detached agent as well. Hence, if any voice is to be trusted, we must 
renounce the idea that a testimony is not at all credible simply because there 
is a general risk of distortion, and instead examine each particular case to 
see whether there is specific reason to dispense with one or another report. 
Let me now briefly suggest why emotional distance may bias our 
deliberation.  
For this purpose, we may focus on the fact that, as Elaine Scarry puts it, 
“every weapon has two ends” 24. Some deep metaphysical and epistemic 
24 Scarry (1987), p. 59. 
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asymmetries emerge, though, between those who confront one or another 
end. Those who hold the weapon have, metaphysically speaking, the power 
to hurt and, epistemically, the capacity to look away from the pain being 
produced and even doubt the intensity of it. By contrast, those who face the 
cutting edge are, from a metaphysical point of view, transformed into 
someone who can just be hurt and who can’t certainly deny the pain they are 
being inflicted. These metaphysical and epistemic asymmetries induce third 
agents to perceive the torturer’s action as justified and the victim’s demand 
as illegitimate. Such appears to be the essential role of interrogation, whose 
question is stereotypically construed as providing a motivation (and, tacitly, 
a justification) for the pain being inflicted, and whose answer is almost 
inevitably viewed as a betrayal. All this in the absence of any specific 
evidence to justify this particular interpretation of both the question and the 
answer. It is clear however that, by this elementary procedure, the initial 
sympathy for the victim’s pain and the moral perplexity for the torturer’s 
action, is reverted and transformed into a justification of the infliction of 
pain. But why is it that, despite our initial sensitivity toward the victim’s 
plight, the interrogation can so easily subvert our moral attitude toward her? 
Some psychological mechanisms will be highlighted to account for this 
tendency to neglect the victim’s predicament and support the torturer’s 
action. Such mechanisms have to do with a variety of fears. The most trivial 
of which is this: if third agents regarded the torturer’s action as arbitrary, 
they would perceive themselves at risk insofar as the torturer’s weapon 
would then appear as only accidentally away from them; but if the contrary 
were true and the infliction of pain on the victim’s body were a legitimate 
manoeuvre of self-defence, then third agents would feel protected by the 
same agent who looked so dangerous from the previous perspective. All this 
suggests that emotions may not only cloud the victim’s mind, but bias the 
views of third agents and their hypothetical judgments, even when they are 
the result of conscientious deliberation. Yet, once all parties are at risk of 
distortion in the benefit of their respective psychological needs and 
dispositions, it seems that specific reason must be mentioned if one or 
another voice is to be either trusted or discredited. Let us now see why Levi 
may be so reluctant to regard his shame as rational. 
5. Who Can Judge the Sondernkommandos?
The idea expressed by the Third-Party Assumption, namely, that the
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limits of morality coincide with those of a third-person accusation, may lie 
at the core of Levi’s reluctance to acknowledge the rationality of his shame. 
For he was adamant in rejecting the idea that a third party might be entitled 
to accuse him (or any other survivor) of having done something shameful. 
In this respect, he emphasizes the legitimacy of his anger (and that of other 
survivors) at those who may feel authorized to judge him despite their lack 
of acquaintance with any experience that might remotely resemble 
Auschwitz: 
We cannot judge our behaviour or that of others, driven at that time by the code 
of that time, on the basis of today’s code; but the anger that pervades us when 
one of the ‘others’ feels entitled to consider us ‘apostates’ or, precisely 
reconverted, seems right to me.25  
It is true that, as Levi himself emphasizes, extermination camps could 
only have been so efficient due to the prisoners’ massive cooperation in 
their activities. And, yet, he insists that no human court, no third party, has 
the authority to judge their actions: 
The condition of the offended does not exclude culpability, and this is often 
objectively serious, but I know of no human tribunal to which one could 
delegate the judgment.26  
A moral evaluation about what survivors might have done in the 
extermination camp should, in any case, “be entrusted only to those who 
found themselves in similar circumstances, and had the possibility to test on 
themselves what it means to act in a state of coercion”27. He feels, thus, 
entitled to draw some distinctions as to the judgment that different survivors 
may deserve given their respective contributions to the Nazi machinery. He 
does not hesitate, for instance, to condemn the Kapos (i.e., foremen of a 
prisoners’ party), but reserves his judgment as to the members of the 
Sondernkommandos, namely: those prisoners who led newcomers to the gas 
chamber, including their own neighbours or even members of their own 
families. Despite the disgust that their actions may arouse, Levi is decided 
to withdraw judgment. He is convinced that no one (not even other 
25 Levi (1986), p. 61. See ivi, p. 58. 
26 Ivi, p. 29. 
27 Ivi, pp. 28-29. 
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survivors) is actually in a position to judge them. Thus, Levi seems to grant 
that there are some cases where an agent may have performed a morally 
horrendous action and still no third party is entitled to judge her, not even 
those who may actually have confronted a relatively similar situation. And, 
yet, it may make sense for the agent herself to feel ashamed or guilty as a 
result of what she did or refrained from doing.  
We may, in view of this, renounce the Third-Party Assumption and 
accept that the limits of morality do not overlap with those of third-person 
praise or accusation. For there are cases, precisely those where the Control 
Assumption is not met, in which an agent may legitimately accuse herself of 
having done something shameful but, nevertheless, no third agent is entitled 
to accuse her of such a thing. To put it another way, we may say that Levi 
was trapped in the following line of reasoning: (a) he took for granted both 
the Control Assumption and the Third-Party Assumption, but (b) strongly 
rejected the idea that a third-party could legitimately accuse him, whereby 
he concluded (c) that his shame was not rational. He was, though, reluctant 
to dismiss it as a purely irrational and idiosyncratic reaction either. A 
reasonable way to make sense of this reluctance is to challenge the Third-
Party Assumption, for that way we make room for Levi’s shame to be 
rational despite the fact that no third party is entitled to judge him given that 
he did not possess the required degree of control. A trivial consequence of 
this is that the Control Assumption must be dropped too, given that the 
conditions under which an agent may legitimately feel responsible for her 
actions (and omissions) do not reduce to those cases where the agent is 
relevantly in control. 
So, it seems that the privileged epistemic authority of those whom, like 
Levi, have faced some harsh experiences of harm, derives not only from the 
fact that, given our psychological condition, human beings are unable to 
grasp some aspects of a moral situation unless they actually face it, but also 
that, in some situations where the Control Assumption is not met, agents 
may still experience an accusation that appears to them as both inescapable 
and strictly first-personal. It is first-personal because only the agent herself 
is entitled to make such an accusation, and it is inescapable insofar as some 
sort of necessity is involved28. It is hard to see, however, how one could 
make sense of this kind of necessity within the Rawlsian approach. For it is 
28 Corbí (2012), (2014), (forthcoming); Williams (1981), (1993), (2002). 
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not rational necessity as it is conceived of within that approach because it is 
agent-relative and, therefore, cannot be established from a detached, 
impartial perspective. But it cannot be construed either as the kind of 
necessity that the Rawlsian approach ascribes to passions. For Levi’s 
experiences involves the question, clearly unintelligible with regard to blind 
passions, as to what being faithful to his impulse may consist of and to what 
extent one may have succeeded in that respect.  
In fact, this impulse presupposes a kind of bond among human beings 
that the Rawlsian approach may be at pains to account for. Thus, the 
original position assumes that the principles of justice are to be agreed upon 
by individuals who would otherwise be unbound to them. This suggests that 
agents, as they are conceived of in the original position, are only 
contractually linked to the principles of justice for the basic structure of a 
society. But if social and political justice is central to our life in a society 
and the principles that must govern our social life are to be determined by 
means of a contract, how are we to conceive of the fundamental bond that 
bring individuals together within a certain society? Should it be regarded as 
merely contractual as well? It is true that Rawls insists on «the profoundly 
social nature of human relationships» 29 . The question is how that 
‘profoundly social nature’ is to be construed and the constraints upon its 
depth that derive from the role ascribed to the original position in his 
conception of political justice.  In this respect, Levi’s experience of shame 
seems to reveal the existence of a deep bond among human beings: we are 
not islands, that is, we may legitimately feel guilt or shame for things that 
others, and not oneself, have done. At first sight, this bond is quite foreign 
to the idea of a contract. For it does not appeal to either the idea of a 
decision that an agent may make or to the conclusion of a deductive 
argument. The demands that the drowned (the name by which Levi refers to 
those who were murdered in Auschwitz) impose upon Levi are not so much 
a matter of decision, but of acknowledgment or recognition. They are 
demands that no third party is entitled to make upon him, and still he feels 
forced to recognize them as essential to his humanity. These asymmetries 
between the first-person and the third-person perspectives imply that failure 
to be faithful to such demands could hardly be paralleled with the 
infringement of a contract. Some may reply, however, that failure to honour 
some contracts comes often with an experience of degradation, and this 
29 Rawls (2005), p. 259. 
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suggests that a deep bond may be already be present in the idea itself of a 
contract. But, in such a case, we ought to spell out how much of our 
humanity is involved in the acceptance of a contract and how the elements 
at play are to be accounted for with the limited resources comprised in the 
original position. So, the dilemma seems to be: either we stick to the 
original position as it was initially designed, but then it is hard to understand 
the kind of bond that Levi’s experience suggest and the demands concerning 
reparation that it imposes; or instead we decide to enrich the resources to 
which one may appeal to in the original position, but then it is hard to 
understand how our deliberation in that position could still be purely 
hypothetical and independent of the particular situations an agent have 
actually be confronted with. So, we may conclude that a deliberation behind 
the veil of ignorance, is not necessarily advantageous with regard to issues 
of political justice and reparation. For that sort of deliberation may be 
misleading not only because the agent’s judgment might inadvertently be 
distorted by some stereotypes and fears, but also because, as I have just 
pointed out, the fact that we are not islands involves a kind of social bond 
that goes beyond the idea of a social contract and this, in turn, implies that 
some judgments concerning morality – like those involved in Levi’s shame- 
are both rational and strictly first-personal. 
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Abstract 
Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after 
being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like 
many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish that he 
finally identified as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of 
those who were exterminated in the Lager. Levi was unable to either 
acknowledge his shame as rational or reject it as irrational. This looks, 
though, like a rather unstable situation calling for some further elucidation. I 
will thus examine Levi’s shame in light of the dominant conception of 
practical deliberation and, more specifically, in view of the the role that 
John Rawls ascribes to the original position. Firstly, I will stress how 
Rawls’ use of the original position as a representational device to the 
determine the principles of justice relies a certain assumption (i.e., the 
Matching Assumption) that Levi’s experience calls into question and, 
secondly, I will identify two assumptions (i.e, The Control Assumption and 
The Third-Party Assumption) that are constitutive of Rawls’ conception of 
rationality and such that they may account for Levi’s reluctance to 
acknowledge the rationality of his shame. Once these constraints are 
brought out, I will argue that Levi’s experience provides serious reason to 
call them into question inasmuch as it invites the existence of a fundamental 
asymmetry between the first- and the third-person perspectives (sec. 3-5). I 
will thus conclude that Primo Levi could coherently have regarded his 
blame as rational, even though no third party is in a position to blame him. 
This challenge to the primacy of the third-person perspective will provide, 
in turn, an additional argument against Rawls’ original position and the 
dominant conception of practical deliberation. 
Keywords: shame, rationality, principles, original position, Auschwitz. 
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